The so-called Chinese diasporas, i.e. Chinese communities outside Greater China (China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) 
Introduction
Chinese is often said to have over 1.3 billion native speakers, making it the world's largest language. These 1.3 billion speakers are mainly in China, Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, but also in Chinese diasporas as far removed as Canada, New Zealand, Peru, and South Africa. Yet, when we look at the specific languages and language varieties these people speak, we immediately realize that the Chinese speaking communities are extremely multilingual and multicultural. Indeed, the Chinese language has always been distinguished by its high level of internal diversity, although all spoken varieties of Chinese are tonal and analytic. In Mainland China, there are between seven and thirteen main regional groups of Chinese, depending on the classification scheme, of which the most widely spoken, by far, is Mandarin (about 850 million s peakers), followed by Wu (90 million speakers), Min (70 million speakers) and C antonese (70 million speakers). Most of these groups are mutually unintelligible. For an account of the history and sociolinguistics of modern Chinese, see Chen (1999) . The international Organization for Standardization classifies Chinese as a macrolanguage with 13 sub-languages .
Language standardization, which in the Chinese context includes the creation of a national language, has been one of the most significant nationbuilding efforts ever since the First Emperor (221-206 B.C.) . In fact, the introduction of the first unified writing system is often attributed to the First Emperor. In the early part of the twentieth century, a common spoken language was created, based on the northern varieties of Chinese, especially that of the capital city of Beijing. Since the founding of the People's Republic in Mainland China, more effort has been expended on the promotion of Putonghua, or the common language, a standardized variety that has become the official language of China. The language standardization effort had reached a certain degree of maturity by the 1970s, with the widespread use of simplified characters in mainland China and the use of pinyin, the romanization system, to teach Putonghua to learners. Nevertheless, diglossia, or even polyglossia, remains a common feature amongst Chinese speakers: it is common for a Chinese to be able to speak two or more varieties of regional Chinese together with standard Putonghua.
As far as the overseas Chinese diasporas are concerned, the vast majority happen to be from three coastal provinces of mainland China, i.e. Guandong, Fujian and Hainan. These provinces are traditionally Cantonese-, Hokkien-, and Hakka-speaking, hence the prominence of these varieties amongst the overseas Chinese communities. The use of Chinese in the Chinese diasporas is determined by a large number of factors, including the migrant ancestors' origin and time of migration, assimilation through generational changes, and official policies of the country of residence. The degrees of language maintenance (of regional and local varieties of Chinese) and language shift (to the standard and national languages) vary greatly from one community to another. One noticeable change in the last twenty years has been the increase of Putonghua-speaking Chinese among the new arrivals and of Putonghua classes for overseas Chinese children across the globe.
In this paper, we focus on the language attitudes and linguistic practices, including literacy practices, of the Chinese communities in Britain, Australia and Singapore. Using data collected through ethnographic interviews, we aim to examine the changing hierarchies of varieties of the Chinese language in the Chinese diasporas, the language ideologies behind such changes, and the implications of the language ideology and of the changes for the education and identity development of the young Chinese in these communities as well as for the constitution of a (speech) community in the post-modern era.
Methodology: ethnographic interviews
The data we use for the discussion in the present paper come from a series of ethnographic interviews we have undertaken over a period of two years (2006 -2008) with a variety of Chinese people from Britain (London, Newcastle and Manchester), Australia (Sydney and Melbourne), and Singapore. Altogether we interviewed 25 people. They include both adults (9 from Britain, 3 from Australia, 5 from Singapore = 17) and children (4 from Britain, 2 from Australia, 2 from Singapore = 8) and both genders. The adults include p rofessionals (e.g. teachers, lawyers, doctors, academics) as well as domestic workers (including two running their own restaurants). All the children were born in their current countries of residence. Four of the five adults from Singapore were born in Singapore, and the other in Malaysia. All the interviewees hold nationalities of the countries of current residence.
The interviews typically lasted between 30 and 45 minutes each, although some lasted more than an hour. All the interviews were tape-recorded. The recordings were then reviewed, and detailed notes on the contents were made. Sections of the interviews were transcribed and translated for the purpose of this paper. As is characteristic in ethnographic interviews (Spradley 1979) , no fixed questions were posed to all the interviewees. Instead, four broad sets of topics were introduced by the interviewers (the authors of the present paper) on: (1) the interviewees' sociolinguistic background and everyday linguistic practices; (2) their views on standard Chinese and the relationship between Putonghua and other varieties of Chinese; (3) the importance of knowing the Chinese language by overseas Chinese children who are born and brought up overseas; and (4) changes in the overseas Chinese communities. In effect, the interviews were open discussions around these topics, and the objective was to obtain some insights into the interviewees' perspectives on these issues. The interviews with the adults were conducted in Chinese, with occasional codeswitching into English. The interviews with the children were a mixture of English and Chinese. Below we discuss what the interviewees said around the four themes.
Who are Chinese speakers? Is Cantonese not Chinese?
One of the most remarkable facts of the interviews we conducted for the present study is the forthrightness with which the participants expressed their views on who can be classified as Chinese speakers and what "the Chinese language" actually means. All the interviewees said that "knowing" Chinese was an integral part of being Chinese -华人当然应当懂华语啦! 'Chinese people should of course know the Chinese language!' (SA4 = Singapore adult 4), 不懂中文还是中国人吗? 'How can Chinese not know Chinese?' (BA2 = British adult 2). Their notions of Chinese and "knowing" are particularly worth noting. The following is an exchange between the interviewer and one adult interviewee in Britain.
( The exchange reveals an important issue, i.e. perceived hierarchy amongst different varieties of Chinese. The interviewee seems very clear that Cantonese should be confined to specific domains such as conversations with family and friends. It is a regional variety and has no role at the national and international level, despite the fact that it has been the lingua franca in many overseas Chi-nese communities for generations. Whereas Putonghua is clearly a national language in his view and all Chinese people should know it. With regard to the difference between Mandarin and Putonghua, this particular interviewee is as vague as most other people and seems to think that it was only a matter of terminology. In fact, Mandarin is the English name often used for northern varieties of Chinese. It is used to refer to the standard national language in Taiwan and Singapore where the Chinese term is 国语 ( guoyu) and 华语 (huayu) respectively. Putonghua is a term from mainland China and it is gaining currency amongst Chinese diasporas in recent years. We will return to this point later in the paper.
Later in the same interview, the interviewer probed further the interviewee's notion of "knowing the national language". The emphasis on literacy is one of the most consistent findings in all the studies of children's language development among the Chinese diasporas worldwide (see studies in He and Xiao 2008). This is not only because of the long standing cultural tradition in literacy education in China (e.g. Bond 1992 ), but also because of the strong belief amongst the Chinese people that there are intricate cultural values inherent in the written Chinese characters that cannot be conveyed in any other way. We will discuss this point further under l anguage ideology in the next section.
The views expressed by this particular interviewee (BA3 in the examples above) are shared across all the other interviewees: to qualify as Chinese, one must know the language, and to know the language means to be able to read and write the written characters. One extreme version of the view was expressed by one of the adults from Australia (AA1), who said:
Children can't be regarded as Chinese if they don't know the Chinese language. Only to be able to understand but not being able to read or write Chinese does not qualify them as Chinese, at least not proper Chinese. I don't care where they are being brought up, they must be able to read and write Chinese to be Chinese.'
There have been many reports from different parts of the world on how se riously the Chinese parents take the literacy education of the young. The Chinese complementary (heritage language) schools in Britain and North America spend most of their teaching time on the reading and writing of Chinese characters (e.g. Curdt-Christiansen 2008). Such emphasis on literacy seems to have had some effect on the children. All our young interviewees agreed that to be able to read and write Chinese character was very important, although they were less emphatic about it being an integral part of their Chinese identity.
The perceived hierarchy amongst the different varieties of the Chinese language as revealed by our interviews is another point worth commenting on. While we had expected the interviewees from Singapore to be more conscious of the hierarchy, due to the explicit language policies of Singapore discouraging the use of regional Chinese varieties in public domains, we did not expect to hear such clear and strong expressions from the others. Here is one example: The views expressed by our interviewees on varieties of the Chinese language and the importance of the written form can be seen as manifestations of the Language Ideology of the speakers. We now discuss this issue in more detail.
Language ideology: what language can do? Literacy/written language as a core cultural value
Language ideology refers to the perceptions held by people about a specific language or language in general, what language can do, and how language should be used. Wolfram and Schilling-Estes define language ideology as "ingrained, unquestioned beliefs about the way the world is, the way it should be, and the way it has to be with respect to language" (Wolfram and SchillingEstes 2006: 9) . Irvine talks about language ideology in terms of "the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests" (Irvine 1989: 253) . Language ideology has significant implications not only for language policy and planning -for instance, standard language ideology often biases towards idealized national norms as maintained and imposed by dominant social groups and institutions and against minority language users (e.g. Lippi-Green's [1997] discussion of the standard language ideology in the United States) -but also for individual speakers in actual use of languages. Their everyday language behavior is influenced by what they believe about the language they are using. Within the Chinese speaking communities, language ideology is a major issue. Despite the fact that the so-called dialects, or fangyan ('regional languages'), of Chinese are structurally distinctive and mutually unintelligible, the popular belief, reinforced by public discourse, is that there is a common language. Here are some responses to our question 标准汉语/中文指的是什 么？'What is Standard Chinese?': The significance of the written form as a vehicle of communicating across different spoken varieties is repeatedly mentioned by the interviewees:
'There has been a unified writing system since the First Emperor. Our Chinese characters are our standard language.'
As we discussed earlier, all Chinese schools, in and outside China, spend a large amount of their time on the teaching of written characters. Most Chinese people hold the view that one cannot be regarded as knowing the language without being able to read and write the Chinese characters.
Our interviews also revealed that the written Chinese characters have a particular cultural symbolism in the Chinese diasporas. One young interviewee told us: (10 Most of our interviewees believe that if they want to learn Putonghua, they should follow the models of standard pronunciation and grammar, and that standard pronunciation and grammar are best produced by people from north of Mainland China, especially Beijing.
With regard to the emphasis on written characters, many of our interviewees remarked on the traditional practice of repeated copying:
'Learning to write Chinese characters has to do with repeated copying. You need to copy many, many times.'
(21) 我们以前小的时候要描红模子。老师很重视书法。只是写对了不 行，还要写得好看。 (AA1) 'We used to trace over the red models when we were little. Teachers paid a lot of attention to handwriting. Writing correctly wasn't enough. You had to write nicely too.'
(22) If we make a mistake, the teacher asks us to write 100 times. (AC2)
How does the language ideology expressed by our interviewees influence their views on the relationship between language and identity? We have a lready seen comments which suggest that our interviewees regard knowing the Chinese language, particularly the written form, as an integral part of being Chinese. We now discuss this issue further with more examples from the i nterviews.
Relationship between language and identity: on not speaking Chinese
Whilst our interviewees all seem to agree on the general cultural significance of the Chinese language, there is considerable disagreement and debate, especially between the different generations, with regard to the relationship between language and identity. Most of our adult interviewees started the interviews with a position that to be Chinese one has to know the Chinese language. Yet, during the discussions and exchanges with the interviewers, some of our adult interviewees accepted that there is now a significant proportion of overseas Chinese who do not know much Chinese. An insistence on knowing the written form of the language would make the identification of what they would regard as "proper Chinese people" even more demanding, as many overseas The differences in the views expressed by our adult and child interviewees reveal a tension within the Chinese diasporas concerning the relationship between language and identity. It seems that some of the adults have consciously or subconsciously adopted what Ang (2001: 30) calls "an essentialist and absolute notion of Chineseness", based on blood, language and customs, while the children want a more dynamic and fluid definition of Chineseness, which would defy the notion of a fixed racial, linguistic and cultural content. The different viewpoints also reveal another version of a monolingual ideology which sees bilinguals as two perfect and balanced monolinguals combined in one body. The ideology seems to be behind the way the adults perceive what they see as a deficit in the children's linguistic abilities; i.e. they all speak good English but their Chinese is not good. Elsewhere we have discussed this ideology as it manifests itself in the linguistic practices of Chinese complementary schools in Britain (Li ). The younger generations of Chinese are beginning to challenge such monolingual ideologies. They want to be regarded as bilinguals and multilinguals, not monolinguals, and they want to be so in a dynamic and creative way utilizing all the linguistic and cultural resources they have and going beyond the confines of the onelanguage-one-context convention. We now turn to the last theme of the interviews we conducted, i.e. ongoing changes within the Chinese diasporas.
Globalization and implications for Chinese and Chinese speaking communities
The current, unprecedented scale of globalization has had a massive impact on the Chinese diasporas. Our interviewees commented on three aspects of change within the Chinese communities that can be seen as consequences of globalization. First, exchanges between the Chinese communities in different parts of the world are increasing rapidly. Cities such as London, Manchester, and Sydney have seen increases in new Chinese immigrants who have previously settled in other parts of Europe, the Asian Pacific, Latin America and South Africa. Several of our interviewees reported that they have relatives who used to live in different parts of the world but now live in the same cities as themselves, and spoke of relatives going to join others in the family in North America or Asia. Contacts with Chinese communities within Britain and Australia and with those in Europe and New Zealand are also on the increase. There is a great deal of sharing of information and social support. People use travel agents, accountants, legal advisors and medical care in locations other than their own place of residence. Even ten years ago, such practices were rare. But now they are a common feature within the Chinese communities. Second is the noticeable increase of new immigrants from Mainland China. They tend to be better educated and wealthier than the last generation of Chinese immigrants thirty or forty years ago. They go for the standard professional jobs rather than family-based employment. Interactions between the new arrivals and the more settled, older immigrants do take place, but in limited domains. Usually the older immigrants provide services such as restaurants and supermarkets that the new arrivals use. On the whole, there is little resentment from the older immigrants. The new arrivals have given them more business opportunities and they have benefited from the rising profile of the Chinese communities generally. Nevertheless, there are tensions between the new and the older immigrants who see their residence in the UK or Australia as serving rather different purposes. Many of the new arrivals see their coming to countries such as Britain and Australia as an opportunity. They choose to migrate because it is a step towards better careers and better lives in their view. The older immigrants, on the other hand, did not have such choice. They left Hong Kong and China because the rapid urbanization and industrialization at the time restricted rather than created opportunities for them. Many could not find the jobs that they really wanted. They felt that they were forced to go abroad. The tensions between the new and older groups are particularly acute with regard to the children. Many of the older immigrants see the young new arrivals as being too spoilt. They had to work extremely hard for their own children, whereas many of the new arrivals seem to have everything they need provided for them. It is true that some of the new arrivals come from the "new rich" in Mainland China. But the perception that all, or the majority of, the new arrivals are wealthy and have socio-political connections is clearly mistaken. Some of the new arrivals do choose to send their children to private schools and buy them fashionable clothing. But the number of such families is not significantly different from that of the older, more settled Chinese immigrant families who often invest in private education and give their children generous allowances.
Perhaps one on-going change in the Chinese diasporas that is most relevant to the present study is the rising profile of Putonghua and its perceived social economic advantages. This is clearly related to the rising profile of China as a world politico-economic power. Our interviews took place during the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics, when there was unprecedented press coverage of mainland China. The overseas Chinese are generally very proud of what China achieved. They have adopted the public discourse of Mainland China that a powerful China would provide a strong backing to overseas diasporas. With the increase in power of Mainland China came the attempt to promote Putonghua both within and beyond the Chinese communities. We reported elsewhere that all the Cantonese schools in Britain (about 210 across the country) offer Putonghua classes; yet none of the Putonghua schools (approximately 30) teach Cantonese or any other regional varieties of Chinese . Putonghua has very strong institutional support, from the Chinese embassies and non-governmental organizations such as the Confucius Institutes, as well as the British and Australian educational and cultural establishments. More and more local schools in Britain and Australia offer Putonghua classes and there are television and other broadcasting services in Putonghua in these countries. Our interviewees clearly see the economic opportunities associated with Putonghua, as the following comments illustrate: As for the effect of the spread of Putonghua on other varieties of Chinese, one young interviewee's remark says it all:
Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the language attitudes and practices within the overseas Chinese diasporas as expressed through interviews with a crosssectional group of Chinese people from Britain, Australia and Singapore. There seems to be considerable consistency across the sample in terms of their views on what the Chinese language refers to, the internal hierarchies amongst the various varieties, and the significance of the written form. We have revealed a strong language ideology which seems to dominate the Chinese diasporas and to influence the linguistic practices of the Chinese people. This language ideology can be summarized as follows: (1) there is a standard Chinese language and it is represented by Putonghua; (2) whatever the spoken variety of Chinese, the written Chinese characters are common to all and are part of the standard form of the language; (3) the Chinese language, especially the written form, is an important cultural symbol and has certain advantages over other languages; (4) to be "proper" Chinese, one must know the Chinese language, especially the written form, which needs to be learned through repeated copying. This language ideology can be seen in action in Chinese families, Chinese schools as well as public institutions. It is also affecting the Chinese people's view of the relationship between language and identity. Our interviews revealed some interesting tensions between the generations in terms of their perspectives on language and identity. Most of the adults seem to have maintained the conventional view that knowing the language is integral to being Chinese. The younger generations, on the other hand, adopt a more flexible approach to identity which is not narrowly based on racial and linguistic grounds but more on broad socio-cultural practices. The tensions between maintaining the tradition and creating a new generation of "proper" Chinese and developing new identities as multilingual and multicultural transnationals will no doubt be a major challenge to the Chinese diasporas in the years to come.
The ongoing changes within the Chinese diasporas, caused in no small measure by globalization, present further challenges to the communities. With regard to language, it seems clear that Putonghua is taking over as the politically and economically dominant language, and regional language varieties such as Cantonese, Hakka and Hokkien, are losing their place to Putonghua. This, coupled with the standard language ideology which seems to be shared by most Chinese people, will no doubt impact on the communities' internal cohesion, the education of the younger generations of Chinese overseas, and future contacts between the diasporas, mainland China and places of origins and ancestry. Whether the future for regional Chinese language varieties is as bleak as the view of our child interviewee in (35) is not entirely certain. One thing is sure, though, and that is that the dynamics within the Chinese diasporas are changing and there is an increasing influence exercised by the rising power of mainland China and everything that represents China, including its standard national language.
From a more theoretical point of view, the case we have presented in this paper with regard to the Chinese diasporas invites a critical reflection on the key sociolinguistic concept of "speech community" (e.g. Labov 1972) . Whilst there are some debates in the literature on exactly how a speech community is defined, most sociolinguists tend to emphasize shared community membership and shared linguistic communication. Our study suggests that language ideology plays an important role in people's perception of the relationship between language and identity, which in turn affects the linguistic practices of the speakers. The concepts of language ideology and identity therefore need to be considered seriously in defining a speech community. This, in our view, is particularly important in an era which is characterized by complex, large-scale population movements and transnational and transcultural interactions.
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